THE "BLANK STARE PHENOMENON": PROVING CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS
Paul L Hoffinan*

I speak from the perspective of a civil rights and human rights practitioner,
giving you the view from the trenches. I have litigated approximately
twenty cases involving customary international law, and from that experience
I have learned lessons, some painful, about the reality of this type of
litigation. Some of my observations may appear pessimistic, but I remain
committed to the cause and, in the long term, I believe that the prospects for
the use of customary law in U.S. courts are good. Despite the cautionary
tales I recount here, I have not given up and do not intend to shift my focus
to an alternate line of work, such as products liability litigation.
The attraction of international human rights law to me is simple:
international human rights law promises more for my clients than U.S.
domestic legal standards in many instances. From the standpoint of a civil
rights lawyer, the enterprise of proving customary human rights norms is not
worth a candle unless the clients will benefit. We may not achieve these
benefits in the short term, but in the long run customary human rights norms
will help the kinds of clients that the American Civil Liberties Union, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, or other similar groups
represent, in a wide variety of contexts.
My assigned topic for this symposium was "proving international
customary law." I wondered whether I was expected to approach this topic
from a technical evidentiary standpoint, because the threshold problem is
proving the basic legitimacy of the concept to skeptical judges. I call this
problem the "blank stare phenomenon.'
The first time I encountered the "blank stare phenomenon" was in
attempting to argue customary law to District Judge Earl Carroll in the
Arizona Sanctuary case' in 1985. Joan Fitzpatrick and Deborah Perluss
prepared an extensive memorandum proving the relevant customary norms
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of temporary refuge and humanitarian initiative, precisely as customary law
should theoretically be proved.2 We provided enormous quantities of
supporting documentation, and we arranged to have Professor Richard Lillich
available as an expert witness. We also had witnesses prepared to lay the
factual predicate for the application of the norms by testifying about
conditions in El Salvador and Guatemala.
The Sanctuary case had a high national profile, and at the hearing on the
relevance of the international law claims the courtroom was filled. I offered
to present our witnesses, but Judge Carroll replied that he was uninterested
in hearing any testimony. However, he was gracious enough to allow me to
talk for about an hour, during which he asked me some questions. Yet,
when we spoke about customary law, there was that stare. That blank stare.
It was as if the concepts we had so meticulously briefed bore no resemblance
to law in the eyes of Judge Carroll. This same phenomenon has occurred in
other courtrooms. This judicial skepticism is one of the largest obstacles for
a lawyer trying to use customary law in domestic litigation.
With respect to the technical aspects of proving customary law, it is
simply unrealistic to expect practitioners to prove state practice in the
manner international legal scholars typically suggest. Rarely will it be
feasible for practitioners to produce the kind of evidence that we presented
in the Sanctuary case. In only a handful of cases will the litigants have the
kind of resources that will enable them to undertake the full-scale proof of
consistent state practice and opinio juris that classic international legal
doctrine prescribes.' Certainly, in ordinary human rights or civil rights
cases practitioners are unlikely to undertake such a demanding project.
Thus, for practical reasons it will generally be necessary to resort to
similar and more accessible sources of proof, such as expert affidavits,
treaties that codify customary norms, resolutions of international bodies, and
4 Moreover,
the other types of proof relied on in cases such as Filartiga.
from a philosophical standpoint as a human rights lawyer, I believe
governments should be held to their promises, as reflected in such instruments.

2 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Government's Motion in
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3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 103 (1987) (giving the basic framework concerning evidence of international law).
' Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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The politics of recognizing customary norms are quite intriguing. Alston
and Simma 5 accurately predict that § 702 of the Restatement will dominate
the recognition of customary norms in the United States. In actual litigation,
judges will defer to the Restatement's list of norms, which will come to
define the universe of customary norms. Resort to the Restatement
eliminates the need for direct proof of extensive state practice, sparing judges
the task of reading and analyzing extensive documentary evidence. Of
course, citation to the Restatement also offers advantages to the litigants, at
least where § 702 includes norms of relevance to their claim.
But, the most interesting aspect concerning the role of § 702 and the
politics of recognizing customary law relates to cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment. Section 702 includes the ban on cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment on its rather short list of
presently binding customary human rights norms. One might think, given
general tendencies, that it should be relatively easy to convince a judge that
this norm exists. But we have had enormous difficulty in doing so. This
difficulty does not arise because the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment does not really exist in international law.
Rather, the difficulty is a political one. A telling example is provided by the
reaction of Judge Real in the Marcos litigation.6
As we were going to the jury in the Marcos case in September of 1992
and we were arguing over jury instructions, Judge Real neglected to put in
jury instructions about prolonged arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment, which were important issues for the
clients that I represented. After argument, Judge Real was convinced that
prolonged arbitrary detention should be added to the jury instructions.
However, he refused to add an instruction concerning cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment. To my mind, the main reason Judge
Real would not recognize the norm was his fear that it might then be applied
to U.S. government officials. Judge Real could recognize a customary
prohibition on torture, as applied to a Philippine dictator, because he could
be confident it would not pertain to the conduct of local law enforcement
officials. Acceptance of the enforceability of the customary international
norm concerning cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment

5 Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y. B. INT'L L. 82 (1992).
6 In re Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., MDL No. 840 (D. Haw. Sept. 24,
1992).
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would lead to demands by prisoners in U.S. jails and prisons that their
conditions be improved beyond the shrinking rights now guaranteed to
prisoners under the U.S. Constitution.
This prospect was not one he
apparently finds inviting. And in that respect, Judge Real may be typical of
the present-day judiciary.
In the Fort? decision, Judge Jensen likewise refused to recognize a
customary norm against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or
punishment. Judge Jensen stressed the unmanageability of the standards and
the lack of a precise definition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
or punishment. But I am skeptical that those factors were the primary reason
for his decision, since Judge Jensen also knew that if he accepted the norm
it would have implications for the United States. Judges have largely the
same reaction to international law as the Executive Branch when it proposes
extensive packages of reservations, declarations, or understandings to the
ratification of human rights treaties. The Forti decision was a judicial
reservation, declaration, or understanding with respect to customary law.
Perhaps we can change this reality, but as for now it is a major obstacle in
human rights litigation.
Another sad lesson I have learned about customary law is that it really
does not restrain U.S. executive action. Notwithstanding theory, when you
litigate against the U.S. government on an issue to which the government is
firmly committed, you lose. This is not a phenomenon unique to human
rights litigation, but it has been an important factor in some of the major
cases.
The Sanctuary case illustrates the problem. From a theoretical standpoint
we had excellent arguments that should have led to the dismissal of some of
the counts in the indictment. Some of the defendants were charged with
harboring aliens because an undocumented person stayed in their house for
an hour, or with illegally transporting undocumented persons because they
drove those persons from one place to another place where those persons
planned to present themselves to immigration authorities. We should have
won those cases, given the arguments we presented. But the judge knew that
this was a big political case. It was the U.S. government against the
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Sanctuary movement, and in interpreting U.S. law the judge was not going
to try to harmonize it with customary law. His position was that the
defendants could not confront the U.S. government and get away with it.
The judge never really tried to come to grips with the international law
arguments because of the political dimension of the case. (We received a
more respectful rejection of these arguments in American Baptist Churches
v. Meese.9 Although we did not prevail on the international law issues, the
issues were taken more seriously.)
Nevertheless, the international law arguments did have a great value in the
Sanctuary case. The international aspect of that case was important in terms
of the overall struggle of the Sanctuary movement to expose the hypocrisy
of U.S. policy and disregard for international legal obligations, whether or
not U.S. courts were prepared to recognize this. These arguments were
influential in the court of public opinion. And, ultimately, vindication for
the claim that administration of the asylum system was badly flawed and
biased came in the settlement of the ABC case,"0 through which many of
the people assisted by the Sanctuary movement received relief after a five or
six year struggle, but we lost the particular case, an important lesson.
The topic of "winning by losing" takes me to my prime example, United
States v. Alvarez-Machain." Alvarez is a perfect example of winning by
losing because of the great embarrassment suffered by the government as a
result of the kidnapping itself and widespread outrage and skepticism
concerning the Supreme Court's tortured interpretation of the United StatesMexico extradition treaty. This embarrassment apparently will yield the
drafting of a new, more precise extradition treaty.
The reasons we declined to rely on customary law initially in the Alvarez
case are complex and relate in large part to the problems of proof and
apparent legitimacy that are the subject of this essay. But after the Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts' holding that Dr. Alvarez's abduction
violated the extradition treaty, we returned to the Ninth Circuit to raise our
customary law claims. We did precisely what we advised the Supreme Court
we intended to do. 12 Customary law had not been raised by the original

9 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
10 American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
"112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
12 In response to a question by Justice O'Connor at oral argument, I informed the
Supreme Court that if we did not prevail on the treaty claim we would return to the Ninth
Circuit for rulings on our objections to the abduction and impending trial based on other
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trial lawyer, but we had taken steps to preserve those claims as the case
proceeded on the extradition treaty issue. Yet, when we returned to the
Ninth Circuit and filed a brief notifying the court of our intention to brief
and argue customary law, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court
decision foreclosed the claim. 3 We went back to them and said, "But
why? Could you please tell us, because there's this case called The Paquete
Habana4 and cases following it that hold that customary law is the law of
the land. The least you could do is tell us why the Supreme Court decision
wipes out an argument that has never been briefed or decided by anybody."
But the Ninth Circuit declined to do that. They peremptorily sent the
mandate down so as to prevent a petition for rehearing en banc. Their
attitude seemed to be, "Get on with it, and don't bother us with any more
international law issues."
So, we went back to the trial court and said to Judge Rafeedie, who we
thought would be more sympathetic, "The Supreme Court hasn't decided
this. That's clear. The Ninth Circuit hasn't told us anything other than that
they read the opinion and possibly for procedural reasons they think you
should deal with this issue initially. We will prove the customary norms to
you."
Judge Rafeedie gazed at me during the oral argument and indicated that
he liked the argument, but he asked pointedly, "Are you telling me that the
Supreme Court is going to let me do this? I mean, aren't they going to
reverse me?"
The message the Ninth Circuit heard from the Supreme Court was that
international law does not matter. They may have read the Supreme Court's
message in Alvarez accurately. This was the most troubling experience I
have encountered in attempting to rely on international law in domestic
litigation, because of the dismissive attitudes of both the Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit to arguments of great seriousness and moment. As soon
as the Supreme Court's decision came down, the lower court judges simply
folded their tents. Even in the Verdugo case 5 where oral argument had
been scheduled on the customary law claims, the Ninth Circuit simply took

international norms, including customary law. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. 91-712
(Supreme Court, Official Transcript of Oral Argument, April 1, 1992) at 34-35.
13 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1992), amended, 1992 U.S.
App. LEMIS 28367 (9th Cir., decided Nov. 3, 1992).
14
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United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 16083 (9th Cir. 1994).
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the motion off its calendar, saying, in effect, "We want to hear your regular
arguments, your usual arguments."
Where one can anticipate that courts are likely to respond to international
law arguments with disdain or superficiality, a plan for embarrassing judges
may be called for. In Alvarez we had a press strategy in anticipation of the
decision and we aggressively tried to embarrass the U.S. government around
the world. We prepared video tapes as well as written press materials. Our
strategy was very successful. I recently performed a computer-assisted
search of press reports and discovered that there were approximately two
thousand articles in the world press on the case during the month following
the decision. Our press clippings indicate that the vast majority of the
coverage was highly critical of the decision and the government's position
in the case. Ultimately, the government was quite embarrassed by the
decision. Whether Justices of the Supreme Court are ever embarrassed by
their erroneous decisions, I am uncertain.
The government's embarrassment was compounded by the acquittal of Dr.
Alvarez pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure at the end of the government's presentation of the
evidence at the trial. Rule 29 requires a showing that no reasonable juror
would vote for a conviction, a difficult standard to meet. The government's
case was shockingly weak, but even so Rule 29 motions are rarely granted
even in cases where they should be, because most judges prefer to send the
case to the jury rather than risk criticism for acquitting the defendant.
Perhaps the Supreme Court's legal error with respect to the treaty argument
in Alvarez influenced Judge Rafeedie to be more responsive to arguments
emphasizing the extraordinary factual weakness of the government's case,
but it is impossible to determine this.
As we litigate customary international law issues, we must remind
ourselves that we operate in an era during which very few rights protective
decisions are being made by the courts, under any body of law. Our
difficulties in the area of customary law are not really surprising in light of
this general trend. About eleven years ago I urged those interested in this
field to channel international human rights claims to state courts. 6 At that
time, a liberal majority presided on the California Supreme Court, one of
whose previous justices was Frank Newman, a prominent scholar in our
field. Since 1986, however, three members of that court have been removed
" Paul L. Hoffman, The Application of International Human Rights Law in State Courts:
A View from California, 18 INT'L LAW. 61 (1984).
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from the bench in an election dominated by concerns that they had
recognized too many rights for persons on California's death row.1 7 Now
the California Supreme Court is barren ground for human rights litigation,
and it is often impossible to convince it even to interpret the California
Constitution more broadly than the Rehnquist Court interprets the United
States Constitution. Civil rights lawyers hesitate to make any creative
arguments because hanging on to existing rights protective doctrine seems
a difficult enough task. It will take some time before the personnel on the
California Supreme Court changes sufficiently to provide a realistic chance
for progressive rights protective arguments to succeed.
From the Supreme Court down, we have similar problems with the federal
judiciary. If we had been able to argue Alvarez when the kidnapping
occurred in April 1990, we would likely have won. Justices Brennan and
Marshall were still on the Supreme Court at that time. Justice Brennan
might even have authored the majority opinion, and it would have been a
wonderful landmark decision. Instead of being remembered as the person
who lost one of the biggest international human rights cases, I would be
known as the lawyer who won Alvarez. This remarkable difference between
what actually happened and what I think might have happened two years
earlier has nothing to do with any hypothetical difference in the quality of
our arguments or the precedents and principles on which we relied. The
change in personnel in the Supreme Court was determinative.
The same problem affects the lower federal courts. The amazing thing is
that we win at all. Judge Pamela Rymer, who decided Handel v. Artukovic,18 one of the chief cases rejecting an implied cause of action for
damages from a customary norm, was the issues director for the Goldwater
campaign in 1964.19 Judge Rymer is a very smart, but very conservative
judge, who is generally receptive to pressures to narrow access to the courts
in line with the policies of the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Such
judges tend to resist expansion of civil rights or human rights law in
particular. With a different judge in Handel ten years ago, we might have
had a decent chance for acceptance of the argument that a claim for damages

" O'Hara & Gregor, Caught in a Backlash, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 17, 1986, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
iS 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
'9 10 People Frequently Mentioned as Maybes, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 1991.
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may be implied from international customary law, analogous to the Biveni"
line of cases implying rights of action from the Constitution.
However, Judge Rymer recently sat on the panel that decided the appeal
in Trajano,21 one of the cases consolidated in the Marcos human rights
litigation. I feared that she might reject the theoretical framework of the
Filartigacase,22 but to my relief, she did not. This demonstrates that we
have succeeded in developing a line of precedent that is sturdy enough to
survive scrutiny even by generally conservative jurists. For example, in the
Abebe-Jiria trial here in Georgia last year concerning an Ethiopian torturer,
on which Beth Stephens and I collaborated, Judge Tidwell's first question at
oral argument was, "Why are we here? This happened in Ethiopia? They
are Ethiopians? Why Atlanta?" The strength of the Filartigaprecedent
convinced Judge Tidwell that it was appropriate for him to apply international human rights law in this case.
A key point in such case may be the fact that we are able to invoke a
statute, the Alien Tort Claims Act.' When there is a statute instructing
judges to look at the law of nations, our task of establishing the legitimacy
and relevance of customary law is much easier. Once in the door, however,
we often discover that the judges are not greatly intrigued by the theoretical
aspects of customary law. What drives the cases are good, solid facts, as in
Abebe-Jiri and the Marcos cases.
Just a week prior to this Colloqiuim (in 1994), the plaintiffs in the Marcos
cases received a $1.2 billion judgment, from a jury that responded to our
request that they grant substantial damages in order to send a message about
the seriousness of violations of customary law. These Hawaiian jurors sent
a powerful message about the deserved consequences to a dictator who
tortures, summarily executes, and arbitrarily detains people in his country.
This provides grounds for optimism.
But the critical crossroads for the ATCA precedents will come when we
try to rely upon them to sue U.S. government defendants. Will the judges

2oBivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971).

21 Trajano

v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub non, MarcosManotoc v. Trajano, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993).
2 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
23Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 1:90-cv-2010 GET (N.D. Ga., Aug. 20, 1993). The
defendant's appeal was argued in January 1995 in the Eleventh Circuit, but we still await the
decision as this Colloquium goes to press.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
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react to that effort in the same way that Judge Real reacted in our argument
about cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment at the Marcos
trial? This concerns me greatly, but we would be faithless to our belief in
the universality of customary law if we failed to invoke these norms against
U.S. defendants guilty of their breach.

